I disagree with Hightower.

What you will find here is: a centrist's view of current events;
a collection of thoughts, arguments, and observations
that I have found appealing and/or amusing over the years;
and, if you choose, your civil contributions which will make it into a conversation.

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Showing posts with label new world order. Show all posts
Showing posts with label new world order. Show all posts

Friday, September 6, 2013

Obama's red lines


I have held off for as long as I can in contemplating the failure of Obama's foreign policy approach.  

I had originally hoped that his rhetoric should be interpreted as: "I will tone down the American assumption of of the role of policeman of the world without abandoning our vital interests."

Although he says he can, without Congressional approval, rewrite laws in the middle of implementation - which the Constitution does not allow - he apparently cannot, without Congressional approval, function as the Commander in Chief - which the Constitution and/or modern practice does allow.

He looks like he is continuing the arguably bellicose tone of our foreign policy (red lines and all that) while implementing it in a very timid and contradictory way.  His earlier talk was of what HE would do about the use of chemical weapons.  When it came time to do it, he waffled and then collapsed in an attempt to get Congress to join him.  Or does he want Congress to disapprove and therefore extract him from his red line rhetoric?

I do not  think that he is directly abandoning our vital interests with one very important exception.

His and America's credibility have taken a dramatic hit in the last few weeks.

Thursday, May 5, 2011

If the president does it ...

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One president has his subordinates capture some of the enemy and pours water in their faces to get information and the left calls him a war criminal and bewails the abandonment of the Geneva Conventions.

Using that information another president sends an armed force into a country with whom we are not at war and without their knowledge (much less consent). They crash into a home, kill a several people, take a body and some stuff and leave.

None of my friends on the left have complained.

I think we need to reconvene at Geneva.
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Tuesday, April 26, 2011

The Mr. Y article

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As I mentioned before my complaint with Bill Clinton is that he did not seize upon the post Cold War era and lead the world in framing the new world order. For 20 years we have willy-nilly watched this new world unfold without laying out a new approach. Time is running out. These folks have something to say on the subject.

PREFACE

By Anne-Marie Slaughter
Bert G. Kerstetter ’66 University Professor of Politics and International Affairs
Princeton University
Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State, 2009-2011


The United States needs a national strategic narrative. We have a national security strategy, which sets forth four core national interests and outlines a number of dimensions of an overarching strategy to advance those interests in the 21st century world. But that is a document written by specialists for specialists. It does not answer a fundamental question that more and more Americans are asking. Where is the United States going in the world? How can we get there? What are the guiding stars that will illuminate the path along the way? We need a story with a beginning,
middle, and projected happy ending that will transcend our political divisions, orient us as a nation, and give us both a common direction and the confidence and commitment to get to our destination.

These questions require new answers because of the universal awareness that we are living through a
time of rapid and universal change. The assumptions of the 20th century, of the U.S. as a bulwark
first against fascism and then against communism, make little sense in a world in
which World War II and its aftermath is as distant to young generations today as the War of 1870
was to the men who designed the United Nations and the international order in the late 1940s.
Consider the description of the U.S. president as “the leader of the free world,” a phrase that
encapsulated U.S. power and the structure of the global order for decades. Yet anyone under
thirty today, a majority of the world’s population, likely has no idea what it means.

Moreover, the U.S. is experiencing its latest round of “declinism,” the periodic certainty that we
are losing all the things that have made us a great nation. In a National Journal poll conducted in
2010, 47% percent of Americans rated China’s economy as the world’s strongest economy, even though
today the U.S. economy is still 2 ½ times larger than the Chinese economy with only 1/6 of the
population. Our crumbling roads and bridges reflect a crumbling self-confidence. Our education
reformers often seem to despair that we can ever educate new generations effectively for the 21st
century economy. Our health care system lags increasingly behind that of other developed nations – even behind British National Health in terms of the respective overall health of the British and American populations.

Against this backdrop, Captain Porter’s and Colonel Mykleby’s “Y article” could not come at a more
propitious time. In 1947 George Kennan published “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs
under the pseudonym X, so as not to reveal his identity as a U.S. Foreign Service Officer. The X
article gave us an intellectual framework within which to understand the rise and eventual fall of
the Soviet Union and a strategy to hasten that objective. Based on that
foundation, the strategic narrative of the Cold War was that the United States was the leader of
the free world against the communist world; that we would invest in containing the Soviet Union and
limiting its expansion while building a dynamic economy and as just, and prosperous a society as
possible. We often departed from that narrative in practice, as George Kennan was one of the first
to recognize. But it was a narrative that fit the facts of the world we perceived well enough to
create and maintain a loose bipartisan national consensus for forty years.

Porter and Mykleby give us a non-partisan blueprint for understanding and reacting to the changes
of the 21st century world. In one sentence, the strategic narrative of the United States in the
21st century is that we want to become the strongest competitor and most influential player in a
deeply inter-connected global system, which requires that we invest less in defense and more in
sustainable prosperity and the tools of effective global engagement.

At first reading, this sentence may not seem to mark much of a change. But look closer. The Y
article narrative responds directly to five major transitions in the global system:

1) From control in a closed system to credible influence in an open system. The authors argue
that Kennan’s strategy of containment was designed for a closed system, in which we assumed that we
could control events through deterrence, defense, and dominance of the international system. The
21st century is an open system, in which unpredictable external events/phenomena are constantly
disturbing and disrupting the system. In this world control is impossible; the best we can do is to
build credible influence – the ability to shape and guide global trends in the direction that
serves our values and interests (prosperity and security) within an interdependent strategic
ecosystem. In other words, the U.S. should stop trying to dominate and direct global events. The
best we can do is to build our capital so that we can influence events as they arise.

2) From containment to sustainment. The move from control to credible influence as a
fundamental strategic goal requires a shift from containment to sustainment (sustainability).
Instead of trying to contain others (the Soviet Union, terrorists, China, etc), we need to focus on
sustaining ourselves in ways that build our strengths and underpin credible influence. That shift
in turn means that the starting point for our strategy should be internal rather than external. The
2010 National Security Strategy did indeed focus on national renewal and global leadership, but
this account makes an even stronger case for why we have to focus first and foremost on investing
our resources domestically in those national resources that can be sustained, such as our youth and
our natural resources (ranging from crops, livestock, and potable water to sources
of energy and materials for industry). We can and must still engage internationally, of course, but
only after a careful weighing of costs and benefits and with as many partners as possible.
Credible influence also requires that we model the behavior we recommend for others, and that we
pay close attention to the gap between our words and our deeds.

3) From deterrence and defense to civilian engagement and competition. Here in many ways is the
hard nub of this narrative. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Admiral Mike Mullen has already said
publicly that the U.S. deficit is our biggest national security threat. He and Secretary of Defense
Robert Gates have also given speeches and written articles calling for “demilitarizing American
foreign policy” and investing more in the tools of civilian engagements – diplomacy and defense. As
we modernize our military and cut spending the tools of 20th century warfare,
we must also invest in a security complex that includes all domestic and foreign policy assets. Our
credibility also requires a willingness to compete with others. Instead of defeatism and
protectionism, we must embrace competition as a way to make ourselves stronger and better (e.g.
Ford today, now competing with Toyota on electric cars). A willingness to compete means a new
narrative on trade and a new willingness to invest in the skills, education, energy sources, and
infrastructure necessary to make our products competitive.

4) From zero sum to positive sum global politics/economics. An interdependent world creates many
converging interests and opportunities for positive-sum rather than zero-sum competition. The
threats that come from interdependence (economic instability, global pandemics, global terrorist
and criminal networks) also create common interests in countering those threats domestically and
internationally. President Obama has often emphasized the significance of moving toward positive
sum politics. To take only one example, the rise of China as a major economic power has been
overall very positive for the U.S. economy and the prosperity and stability of East Asia. The
United States must be careful to guard our interests and those of our allies, but we miss great
opportunities if we assume that the rise of some necessarily means the decline of others.

5) From national security to national prosperity and security. The piece closes with a call
for a National Prosperity and Security Act to replace the National Security Act of 1947. The term
“national security” only entered the foreign policy lexicon after 1947 to reflect the merger of
defense and foreign affairs. Today our security lies as much or more in our prosperity as in our
military capabilities. Our vocabulary, our institutions, and our assumptions must reflect that
shift. “National security” has become a trump card, justifying military spending even as the
domestic foundations of our national strength are crumbling. “National prosperity and security”
reminds
us where our true security begins. Foreign policy pundits have long called for an overhaul of NSC
68, the blueprint for the national security state that accompanied the grand strategy of
containment. If we are truly to become the strongest competitor and most influential player in the
deeply interconnected world of the 21st century, then we need a new blueprint.

A narrative is a story. A national strategic narrative must be a story that all Americans can
understand and identify with in their own lives. America’s national story has always see-sawed
between exceptionalism and universalism. We think that we are an exceptional nation, but a core
part of that exceptionalism is a commitment to universal values – to the equality of all human
beings not just within the borders of the United States, but around the world. We should thus
embrace the rise of other nations when that rise is powered by expanded prosperity, opportunity,
and dignity for their peoples. In such a world we do not need to see ourselves as the automatic
leader of any bloc of nations. We should be prepared instead to earn our influence through our
ability to compete with other nations, the evident prosperity and wellbeing of our people, and our
ability to engage not just with states but with societies in all their richness and complexity. We
do not want to be the sole superpower that billions of people around the world have learned to hate
from fear of our military might. We seek instead to be the nation other nations listen to, rely on
and emulate out of respect and admiration.

The Y article is the first step down that new path. It is written by two military men who have put their lives on the line in the defense of their country and who are non-partisan by profession and conviction. Their insights and ideas should spark a national conversation. All it takes is for politicians, pundits, journalists, businesspeople, civic leaders, and engaged citizens across the country to read and respond.

That was the preface.
Read the entire article here.
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Friday, April 1, 2011

The new world order

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So here is the thing for which I cannot forgive Bill Clinton and to some extent Bush 41. The Cold War was over and it was time to lay the foundation for a new world. That would mean getting the leadership of both parties together and decide what our approach to the world for the next half century (or even a decade or two) would be.

Apparently, Bill didn't even think about it. Naw, something worth doin' will turn up.

See a discussion about this by Fareed Zakaria.
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Saturday, March 19, 2011

Libya 4

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On March 2 I said here:
"... this seems quite different from Yugoslavia during the Clinton administration. The Europeans appear to be stepping up a lot more here than they did then. I think that it is a good sign that others are doing something instead of talking about what we should do.

I do think that we should participate in the world's dealing with these kinds of things. But it should be by doing our fair share within the appropriate international organization. That is a much better way to deal with things like this than to have unilateral intervention by the US."

It appears that this is what we are doing and I believe that it is a much better way to do things. It also, quite appropriately, includes support (hopefully with money attached) from the Arab League.
It is slower than would have been desired, but you don't want the World's war machines to go into action too quickly. Perhaps that can be safely improved with experience.

One more thing. We are involving ourselves in Libya this little and this late, at least in part because we are already involved in two wars in the Middle East. One should be careful about getting into these small wars because you can never be sure of what may be coming down the pike. That is one more argument against having gone into Iraq.

Sunday, March 13, 2011

New world order: stability or rise and fall?

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Consider the following thought experiment.
Suppose we could be assured that there were going to be no major wars in the future. Small stuff maybe, but nothing like WWII where the major powers go after each other tooth and nail.

Now in that environment which of the following is most likely:
A. The nations of the world would trend toward comparable levels of economic well being.
B. Various nations would "rise and fall" in the sense that some would have more economic success than others, but the arrangement at any one time could not be expected to continue indefinitely. A country's rise would be economic not military.

Thursday, February 17, 2011

long range planning

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Consider any major problem facing the seven billion people in the world.

Ask yourself, “What would that problem look like, if there were only
1 billion of them."

My question is "Why do people propose solutions to those problems that do not include a reduction in the population, or at least the encouragment of it?
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Friday, February 11, 2011

Congratulations to the Egyptians!

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Now comes the hard part. The transition from what has been to what will be. When contemplating the difficulty of the job they have in front of them I naturally compare their problems with those that our own founders faced in the late 18th century.

In many ways their job is much harder than ours was.

Our colonies had a lot of democratic experience. Our guys had the luxury of a lot of time. In fact they had enough time to try something that didn’t work (the Articles of Confederation) and after that failure they still had time to take two years to create and implement a constitution. During that time there was no outside interference and George Washington stood as the rock that guaranteed that there would be no dictatorship.

The Egyptians have probably not more than a year and there will be all sorts of interference from various outside groups and there will be internal groups that will want to create one or another form of dictatorship. Also, people expect a lot more from government now than they did then. The Egyptians have some positives though. The world now has had 224 more years of experience with democracy than it did in 1787. They can draw on that and there are a lot of people who wish them well.

If their friends (read “us”) can find the right balance between support and noninterference, maybe they can make it that would help.
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Sunday, November 14, 2010

the new capitalism

(This is a previous post renamed.) So the Cold War was over and democratic capitalism defeated communism (=1 party dictatorship +socialism).  All the world (almost) is clamoring into developing capitalism.  Is there any reason to believe that our version of capitalism will continue to be dominant or even successful in this new world?  I hear a lot about China not playing by the rules (trade and environmental) and a new state capitalism.  I'll bet the Chinese believe that they have just as much right as anyone else to write the rules.  Remember, there is no referee.

Sunday, September 5, 2010

American power

In recent years, I have often said to European friends: So, you didn’t like a world of too much American power? See how you like a world of too little American power — because it is coming to a geopolitical theater near you. – Thomas Friedman

Thursday, September 2, 2010

organizational warfare

OK, so here are some questions. Can an organization “declare war on a country”? Can a person, citizen or not, “declare war on a country”? If a person joins an organization that has declared war on a country, may the country consider him to be an enemy combatant? Of course they can make the statements or take actions that make the statements for them. But does the country have the right to treat that as a war situation? What are the rights of and permissible actions available to the country in that situation? Can it take them at their word and treat them an “enemy combatants”? If they hide in dark alleys in foreign countries can it go there and kill them? If the answer is yes then what kind of procedure should a government go through before they put someone on that “kill or capture list”?
Obama has a kill or capture list and Awlaki is on it. The left is finally starting to ask questions about it. This is the same left that went berserk when Bush poured water in the faces of known terrorists but ….

Wednesday, June 16, 2010

Commitments and Power (on Rob’s 6-13 comment)

Walter Lippman said that Foreign Policy is “bringing into balance, with a comfortable margin of power in reserve, the nation’s commitments and the nation’s power.” At the end of WWII the US was the dominant power. It was the kind of dominance that cannot last long without an outmoded kind of empire that a free nation could not undertake even if it wanted to. We took on extensive commitments, primarily the defense of our side in the Cold War. By the time the Cold War ended we were no longer in that kind of dominant position. Even though (perhaps because) the world had definitely turned our way, the most we could aspire to was to be the first among equals. (For a professional description of this view read Fareed Zakaria’s The Post American World.) http://www.amazon.com/Post-American-World-Fareed-Zakaria/dp/039306235X  This brings me to my main complaint with Bill Clinton. In 1992 the Cold War was over. America’s 45 year long foreign policy had succeeded. NATO’s mission was accomplished. “Done, done, and done. Now what?” What he should have done was get with Congress and formulate a new bipartisan foreign policy. Assess the threats, set the objectives. Most importantly recognize that our new financial position meant that we could no longer do whatever we wanted to. Power is measured in productivity. We produce 20-25 % of the world’s goods and services and we make 50% of the world’s military expenditures. The nation’s commitments and the nation’s power are out of balance, and our reserve (money) is actually negative.